Mind-Body Causal Relationship: Inquiry into Mental Health Disorders and the Limits of Neurobiological Reductionism

Abstract

This paper undertook a critical and exploratory inquiry into how causality in the mind-body relationship has been theorised and operationalised in contemporary mental health discourse. Unlike dominant approaches that prioritised brain-based explanations for psychological disorders, this paper interrogated the ontological and epistemic assumptions underpinning neurobiological reductionism, which is the belief that all mental phenomena can be explained purely through physical processes in the brain. Approached through the philosophy of mind, particularly (emergentism, dual-aspect monism and enactivism), the paper reframed mental disorders not as mere neurochemical malfunctions but as complex, causally layered phenomena emerging from interactions between the physical, subjective, social, and environmental domains. Methodologically, the study applied conceptual analysis, drawing from theoretical triangulation across analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and systems theory to reconstruct the mind-body problem in light of clinical realities such as treatment-resistant depression and psychosomatic disorders. The proposed framework challenged linear, one-directional causality and instead, advances a recursive, non-reductive model where mind and body are mutually influential yet ontologically distinct. The discussion engaged historical trajectories from Descartes to contemporary neuroscience, while critically reviewing diagnostic paradigms in psychiatry (e.g., DSM-5) that reflect implicit reductionist biases. The paper concluded by suggesting a shift toward pluralist explanatory models in mental health, advocating for integrative diagnostics and treatment modalities that considers both neural and experiential dimensions.